This paper analyses the changing character of the economic ideas informing economic and in particular fiscal policy making in Britain since the global financial crisis broke. It charts some of the key interventions and public spending actions taken by the UK Government, situating 
Introduction
The central political battle in Britain in the responses to the present crisis has been over the meaning of 'fiscal rectitude' and how that rectitude relates to economic credibility. This paper analyses that battle by charting some of the key decisions taken by the UK Government, situating these in the context of ideas about management of the public finances and Keynesianism. It explores what has happened to 'debt and deficit discourse', and its political salience in the UK in the wake of the global financial crisis.
Evaluating debt and deficit dynamics is inherently difficult because of the many imponderables in terms of changes in economic fundamentals, and because of the unpredictability of financial market assessments of particular country's fiscal, debt or deficit positions and prospects. This unpredictability is all the more pronounced for fiscal consolidation strategies projected many years into the future. A good deal hinges, therefore, on the prior assumptions (for example about the relationships between debt, and growth, debt and interest rates, or fiscal policy and growth) made by national governments and international economic institutions designed to counter these imponderable and unpredictable aspects of fiscal policy and debt dynamics. As has been argued elsewhere in relation to the balance of payments, in areas with significant uncertainty over assessment mechanisms, and where prior assumptions play an important role, the scope for construction and reconstruction of economic rectitude assessment is particularly great (Clift & Tomlinson 2008) .
One aim of this paper is to demonstrate the historically contingent nature of fiscal policy and sustainability assessment by comparing its shifting, conjunctural, constructions, rooted in underlying political economic assumptions, before and after the current financial crisis broke, and how these different underlying assumptions have become the stuff of a contested politics within UK and wider political debates since 2008. Assessment of fiscal policy, and fiscal sustainability must be placed in the context not only of material conditions of the national and global economy, but also of ideational factors -conventional wisdoms and climates of opinion (and their normative underpinnings) about fiscal policy, fiscal positions, and sovereign debt. The impact of these ideational factors is significant. Here we highlight the significance of the changing interpretive frameworks within which fiscal policy assessment is situated, charting the evolution of crisis narratives within the UK policy debate. We note some significant shifts in the presentation of Britain's debt and deficit position, and its sustainability.
The other aim of this paper is to begin to explore the implications of these processes of fiscal rectitude construction for economic strategies to address Britain's paucity of economic growth, and more broadly implications for the development of a revived British growth model. UK Governments, in seeking to shape economic rectitude through fiscal rules, have made rules regimes the stuff of a contested politics of fiscal credibility. Rules have the potential to increase policy space in an open, globalising economy. In this paper, we explore the fiscal rules regime to reveal the 'footprints' of an underlying conception of the appropriate size and role of the state within the economy. The main line of argument and analytical focus is on the relationship between fiscal policy and growth in the UK economy.
Here we are interested in state capacity in relation to distributing the burden of the adjustment that austerity entails, analysing both the room to manoeuvre enjoyed by the Coalition Government to carve out its fiscal policy strategy, and the impact of said strategy on growth.
The current UK government conceives of the credibility and debt sustainability constraints its fiscal policy is operating under as very tight. It sees very little potential for activist fiscal policy in support of growth. It also pays little attention to aggregate demand in the economy and the distributive impact of fiscal policy in relation to demand. On both counts, this view is at odds with other authoritative voices in the global economy, notably the IMF, on both the scope for fiscal policy activism and the appropriate role of fiscal policy in support of aggregate demand. The Fund's policy advice and commentary on the UK betrays a broadly Keynesian approach (see Clift & Tomlinson 2011) , and considers the UK Government to enjoy considerably more fiscal policy 'space' than they currently choose to recognise. Furthermore, they advise that more could be done through fiscal policy to protect vulnerable social groups and lower earners from bearing the burden of adjustment. Tax and spending measures directed at these groups have the highest multipliers, the Fund argues, and hence the most impact in a downturn because of their potential to increase aggregate demand. The UK Government, in locking itself into its current fiscal austerity path, has eschewed these fiscal policy options in support of growth.
The analysis below demonstrates how fiscal rectitude construction is a transient historical phenomenon by outlining three the distinct phases of UK Government fiscal policy discourse, and crisis narrative; New Labour up to the crisis, New Labour 2008-2010, and the Coalition government May 2010-2012. Each is interpreted here as a process of re-construction of economic and fiscal rectitude. Crucially, the scale and speed of fiscal retrenchment presented as imperative (and without which a damaging loss of confidence and credibility becomes likely) differed appreciably between the different post-crisis narratives. Thereafter, we consider the impact the Coalition's construction of fiscal rectitude on the prospects for steering the UK economy on a path to growth, and potentially discovering a new British growth model.
British Economic Management and the Politics of Fiscal Rectitude

I -New Labour
A key predicate of the reconstruction of Labour thinking on the economy in the years prior to the election of the New Labour government in 1997 was the centrality of policy credibility, and the role of rules-based regimes in securing that credibility. Key architects of New Labour's thinking on the economy Ed Balls and Gordon Brown constructed a doctrine of 'credible Keynesianism'. This, they argued, would allow a Labour government to pursue its policy objectives, including 'coarse tuning' the economy, without falling foul of the international economic pressures which beset previous Labour governments. (Clift and Tomlinson, 2004; Clift and Tomlinson, 2007) . The thinking here chimes with IMF advocacy of fiscal rules noted above, designed to bolster credibility and shape expectations in bond markets (IMF 2010a: 48-9) .
The policy framework to achieve this credibility was both monetary and fiscal. On the monetary side the granting of independence to the Bank of England, coupled with an inflation target, was the key measure, and was enacted in 1997. Far more important in the current crisis has been fiscal rectitude, especially since very substantial spending has adversely affected the public finances. New Labour's attempt at achieving fiscal rectitude led to the formulation in 1998 of two key 'rules'. The first of these, the 'golden rule', said that the government would, over the cycle, borrow only to invest and not to fund current spending.
The second said that public sector net debt (i.e. the accumulated borrowings of government) would be held stable, and would normally be less than 40 per cent over the cycle (Treasury, 1998) .
One interpretation is that in its first years in office the policy successfully shook-off Labour's history of credibility problems by sticking to tight rules, before allowing itself to pursue a policy of massive public spending increases (in 2008/9 prices, spending rose from £408 million in 1999/2000 to £549 million in 2007/8) not fully matched by tax increases. This policy seems not to have had serious deleterious effects on confidence, partly because the net debt position remained within the rules (albeit deteriorating after 2001/2), but also because of the general euphoria about the combination of non-inflationary continuous expansion (NICE). At the time, few in financial markets challenged Brown's hubristic claims by about the 'end of boom and bust'.
Overall, prior to 2008, Labour had constructed and sustained policy credibility despite one of its rules having been broken, and had pursued a huge expansion of public spending which was largely funded by tax revenue increases. The cyclically-adjusted deficit in 2007/8 was 0.6 per cent of GDP. This is indicative of the efficacy of the strategy of national governments participating in the construction of their own fiscal credibility assessment process through the use of fiscal rules. Such was the confidence accrued by the UK that it could even break its own rules, and indeed rewrite them slightly, without an adverse effect on the perceptions of bond market participants. Early hopes to remain within rules (Treasury 2008: 4-5, 14, 19, 23-30) These projections clearly pushed policy outside the New Labour fiscal rule. The response was to create a new rule for a changed context, the 'temporary fiscal operating rule'. This illustrates the latitude and room to manoeuvre national governments who enjoy credibility can exploit in the construction of the fiscal yardsticks by which they are judged. In the precrisis period, the fiscal 'golden rule' was amended -the beginning of the cycle was retrospectively redefined to suit the presentation the New Labour Government wanted to offer of its fiscal policy, effectively cooking the books so that instead of breaking its rule, New Labour could claim to have kept within it. When the crisis hit, the government took the opportunity to design a new rule, 'to set policies to improve the cyclically-adjusted current budget each year, once the economy emerges from the down turn, so it reaches balance and debt is falling as a proportion of GDP once the shocks have worked their way through the economy in full' (Treasury 2009, pp.19, 27, 31, 35-38) . The argument was that the economy had been subject to a wholly unprecedented shock, which required exceptional fiscal measures. Nevertheless, the New Labour legacy was defended as having bequeathed more space for fiscal support than 'some other countries', especially because of low debt levels (Treasury 2009, p.27) .
A crucial feature of the presentation of the fiscal argument was the international agreement made by the G20 countries and the European Council, which included a commitment to coordinated fiscal stimuli endorsed by the IMF (G20 2009), with the British position being emphasised as in line with the G7 average (Treasury 2009, pp.15, 27-29) . This appeal to authoritative international bodies was an important element of New Labour's (re-) construction of its fiscal rectitude in the wake of the crisis. Another element of the credibility bolstering exercise, again consistent with IMF advocacy of the development of 'robust' fiscal frameworks (IMF 2010a: 48-9) , was the inclusion of independent assessments of the fiscal authorities assumptions and forecasts to increase transparency and credibility. Accordingly, the budget papers sought to give more credibility to the fiscal estimates by providing the National Audit Office assessment of the Treasury's assumptions (Treasury 2009, p.227). As we shall see below, whether these assessments were independent enough became a key point of contention between Labour and the Conservatives both before and after the May 2010 general election.
Seeking to secure credibility for its policies, and again testament to the attraction of rules based regimes to shape expectations and secure credibility with financial market participants, The Conservatives argued in response that in the absence of any independent body, the OBR which they proposed, the FRA would do nothing to enhance credibility. Yet, they argued, 'the credibility of our nation and its ability to pay its way in the world are being questioned by markets, investors and credit rating agencies around the world'. The evidence of this problem was said to be rising gilt yields, a harbinger of higher interest rates: 'Britain's credit rating is for the first time in our history at serious risk and British interest rates are set to rise in a recovery' (Hansard 2010A, cols 75-76) . In this debate it was the Labour MP, Frank
Field, who argued that neither the proposed FRA nor the OBR were significant sources of fiscal discipline, which would be enforced by 'credit agencies and the bond market', and argued that there was a danger of a gilt strike (Hansard 2010A cols 80-84). Such appeals to adverse effects in bond markets are a consistent theme of the construction of crisis narratives, particularly those asserting the necessity of tighter and faster fiscal retrenchment. However, as we shall see below, the actual evolution of bond market attitudes towards the UK remained overall extremely positive and benign throughout this period (IMF 2009a; IMF 2010a) The March 2010 budget presentation argued that the recession had had a two-fold effect on the fiscal balance. First, the workings of the automatic stabilisers and the governments deliberate fiscal loosening to offset the fall in demand had worsened the position. But in addition, it was argued, the recession 'had a more persistent impact on the public finances, due to its downward impact on the trend level of output in the economy, which is assumed to be just over 5 per cent, a permanent loss of tax receipts from the financial and housing sectors and the projected rebalancing of the economic activity, which will result in less tax-rich growth in the economy' (Treasury 2010A, p21).
Under New Labour, after the crisis struck, automatic stabilisers were used to off-set the collapse in demand resulting from the recession. The adverse effects on public finances did not erode the fiscal policy space. The evolution of IMF thinking about appropriate crisis There was a shift in the crisis narrative underpinning that construction of fiscal rectitude in Britain, from a crisis of growth to a crisis of debt (Hay 2011) . The assumptions underpinning this changing approach to debt and fiscal policy were neo-liberal in origin, informed by arguments about 'crowding out' effects of public expenditure; 'with governments issuing so much debt, the private sector cannot compete for funds, and as such investment and output must fall' (Blyth 2010: 37) . In many ways these were an updating of the UK 'Treasury view' The crowding out effect argument, a mainstay of neo-liberal analysis of public finance and state/market relations, assumes amongst other things rising government bond yields which reflect rising market fears of default, or at least eroding fiscal credibility. This assumption also underpins the preaching of austerity to stave off other Greek-style crises. Both elements have been a feature of the debate in Germany (and within the ECB), and also since May 2010
by the new UK government, all having demonstrated themselves to be 'aggressive champions of budget consolidation and austerity politics' (Blyth 2010: 36) . As we shall see below, these assumptions are not borne out by the actual evolution of bond yields which betray no evidence of fiscal sustainability concerns for the UK. Indeed, many commentators see the markets as more concerned about the adverse effects of austerity on growth, and how this lack of growth undermines fiscal sustainability (Blanchard 2012; . Subsequent justification of the Coalition government economic stance in interviews and the media has often justified the shift in policy approach with reference to the need to stave off a Greek style crisis in the UK in mid 2010. Importantly, and contrary to was to be later alleged, the budget document itself does not make claims that Labour's policy proposals would have led to a 'Greek-like' financial crisis,. In fact, the document says:
'While the fiscal position in the UK is very challenging, the financing environment has remained supportive and, among other factors, the new Government's fiscal credibility has already helped to keep interest rates close to record lows…Accelerated fiscal consolidation will help keep market interest rates lower for longer, supporting economic recovery and lowering the proportion of tax revenues devoted to debt service payments. The government has set out a credible deficit reduction plan that should provide businesses with the confidence they need to plan and invest, supporting the necessary recovery in business investment' (Treasury 2010B p.9). Credibility for this mandate would be enhanced by the creation of the OBR: 'our fiscal mandate will be forward looking, and the judge on whether we are on course will not be the Chancellor but the OBR' (col 167).
In responding to the budget, Harriet Harman for Labour explicitly attacked the use by the government of Greece as a warning of what could occur in Britain: Greece is in a completely different position from us: it is still in recession; it does not control its interest rates; and its debt is over 115 per cent of its GDP. Greece is no alibi for this Tory budget' (col 183).
The issue of Greece was returned to later in the debate, when a Labour MP stressed that 'the debt-GDP ratio in Greece is two and half times that of the UK, and the maturity of the debt is, on average, 13 years, compared with an OECD average of two to three years' (cols 206-207).
Interpreting UK Fiscal Policy: The IMF View
This section places the analysis of this contested politics of British fiscal policy in the context of IMF views on appropriate fiscal rules and fiscal policy standards. In doing so, we unearth a good deal less attachment from the IMF to the 'front-loading' of austerity and fiscal consolidation for the UK economy, resulting from concerns regarding the adverse effect on growth. The nationally differentiated, contingent analysis of particular country's debt positions (linked to maturity of debt, history of default, and government revenue raising potential) give the UK more leeway than enjoyed by certain other economies facing weak growth and deteriorating public finances. Nevertheless, the UK is 'locked in' to commitments to harsh fiscal consolidation.
A notable feature of successive UK Governments' presentation of the fiscal position The IMF as a 'reputational intermediary' has been particularly central within this mobilisation of 'authoritative' voices in seeking to bolster the fiscal credibility. With the onset of the current crisis, the IMF was once again thrust centre-stage, and as it began lending first to developing and then to some advanced economies, its significance increased (Broome 2010). The IMF has seen a revival of its import for advanced economies, both as a lender and as an assessor of (and source of credibility for) governmental economic policies (Moschella 2010: 431-2).
A consistent feature of Fund discussion of fiscal sustainability is the recognition of 'heightening market sensitivity to variations in fiscal performance across countries', and 'increased attention being paid by markets to differences in underlying fiscal conditions across countries' (IMF 2010a: 5; IMF 2009a: 18-19) . This underscores the importance of the above points about specific national trajectories, involving distinctive debt structures, dynamics, conditions, varying revenue raising capacities and different track records increasing or reducing leeway. This in turn affects 'the degree to which each country has fiscal space' (IMF 2008: 11) . The nationally differentiated assessments of fiscal sustainability favoured by the IMF put it in a very different category to the troubled Euro-zone economies.
The costs of debt servicing are obviously set to rise, with the Fund predicting a rise in net interest payments as a percentage of GDP for advanced economies-from 1.9 percent of GDP in 2007 to 3.5 percent in 2014 (IMF 2009a: 18 ). Yet analysis prepared by the IMF fiscal affairs department in 2010 argued that sovereign debt default risks for many advanced economies are overstated. It noted that 'in today's advanced economies, the main issue is the primary deficit rather than the interest bill', given the relatively long maturity of government debt -7 years on average -debt structures are generally more resilient to abrupt changes in market perceptions than was the case for emerging economy defaulters of the past.' (IMF 2010d: 6-7). Overall, 'average interest rates remain relatively low, giving time for fiscal adjustment to convince markets' (IMF 2010d: 11) . Furthermore, placed in historical context, low interest rates mean that the debt servicing costs are far from unprecedented; 'The interest bill for the United Kingdom nearly doubles in percent of GDP, but stays below levels of the late-1980s and mid-1990s, as interest rates remain relatively low (IMF 2009a: 18) .
As the IMF itself notes, prognostications about fiscal adjustment over a 20 year period is an imprecise exercise, not least because of the potential for irrational financial market response to signals relating to sovereign fiscal credibility noted by the Fund (2010d: 4; see also
Moschella 2010). As the IMF Mission in the UK conducting Article IV consultations in
Summer 2010 noted, 'the precise headwinds from fiscal consolidation are difficult to predict-they could turn out more powerful than expected or more modest as during the 1990s consolidation' (IMF 2010b: 20) . The uncertainty is partly because 'the precise magnitude of primary adjustment that is required over the medium term is sensitive to assumptions', specifically 'assumptions about the differential between the rate of output growth and the rate of interest have an impact on estimated adjustment needs' (IMF 2009a: 24) . What is clear is that the scale of fiscal adjustment is large-though not unprecedented. It is also clear that some countries enjoy more leeway than others, especially those on good terms with the bond markets.
In assessing how far British policy has conformed to IMF standards, it needs to be emphasized that the norms IMF/Member State relations mean that, outside an extreme crisis situation, the Fund will never get itself into the position of publicly arbitrating between a national government and its political opponent's approach to economic policy. Its commentary, and any critique, will always be phrased in very diplomatic and guarded termspartly in recognition of the potentially adverse effects upon credibility that strongly worded criticism of economic strategy could have. This point is implicit in Chancellor Osborne's suggestion that under the Labour government 'many warnings were made in private, especially about the precarious fiscal position' by the IMF (IMF2011b).
The IMF had since 2008 been consistently re-affirming, where countries enjoying 'fiscal space' were concerned, the key role of government macroeconomic policy, both unorthodox monetary policy such as quantitative easing but also the free play of automatic stabilisers as well as activist fiscal policy to boost demand (see Clift & Tomlinson 2011) . Even in the context of deteriorating public finances, the Fund argued that a delicate balance must be struck; 'as policymakers begin to implement strategies for exiting from crisis-related intervention policies, care should also be taken to ensure that policy actions do not undermine the recovery' (Strauss-Kahn 2010: 4).
In June 2010, Olivier Blanchard, head of the research department at the IMF, and Carlo Cottarelli, director of the IMF's fiscal affairs department, published the culmination of their reflections to that date on fiscal policy, fiscal consolidation, and fiscal sustainability. They offered their 'ten commandments for fiscal adjustment in advanced economies' on the IMF blog. 3 Here they sounded warnings against 'front-loading' of fiscal tightening, which they deem in general to be 'inappropriate' given the need to preserve short-term and long-term growth; 'too much adjustment could also hamper growth, and this is not a trivial risk'. They underlined the need for 'appropriate calibration of fiscal targets'. Whilst, in the interests of enhancing the credibility of adjustment, 'a non-trivial first installment is needed' they insisted 'a steady pace of adjustment is more important than front-loading, which could undermine the recovery and be reversed' (Blanchard and Cottarelli 2010) . stabilisers towards those with a higher marginal propensity to spend, and demonstrating the new concern with distributional impacts of the post-crisis IMF, Chopra noted "Although consolidation is necessary, it's important that it be fair, which means that it will be important to protect the poor and the vulnerable". He also underlined the need to allow automatic stabilisers to 'operate freely in both directions', and warning that "If there's a sharp and prolonged downturn in the economy, the pace of fiscal consolidation may need to be adapted," (IMF 2010c).
All of this was pitched in general terms
The adverse effects on growth of the more drastic fiscal tightening contained in the IMF's 'central scenario' assessment are set out, and their implications for necessary flexibility in fiscal policy underlined;
''to the extent that fiscal retrenchment weakens aggregate demand over a period that is more extended than envisaged in the central scenario, the resulting resource slack could also lead to some further scrapping of idle capital and persistent unemployment, reducing both actual and potential output' (IMF 2010b: 25) 'In the unexpected but possible case of a significant and prolonged downturn, alongside further support from monetary policy, temporary tax cuts should also be considered. Such tax cuts are faster to implement and more credibly temporary than expenditure shifts and should be targeted to low-income households, employment creation, or investment to increase their multipliers.' (IMF 2010b: 30) The Staff appraisal repeatedly emphases the downside risk of the fiscal stance, how the 'headwinds from fiscal consolidation could turn out to be more powerful than expected' and the importance of automatic stabilisers (IMF 2010b: 42-3) . In general, the mood music from the IMF assessment of UK fiscal policy since May 2010 suggests that, whilst happy to endorse the stance taken, they are focussed on the inevitable adverse growth effects of the fiscal retrenchment, concerned at how large they may be. The Fund is furthermore keen to underline the need for flexible policy responses (and the free play of automatic stabilisers), and contingency plans should the fiscal retrenchment choke off the economic recovery. The
Fund are in favour of the fiscal rules regime and OBR, if anything -the Fund might think that this would buy more fiscal space than the UK government is seeking to exploit.
When the UK's September 2010 article VI consultations were discussed at the IMF executive board, on balance Directors were supportive of the government's frontloaded fiscal consolidation, on grounds of preserving confidence in debt sustainability, and restoring fiscal space to cope with future shocks. They felt that these benefits outweigh expected costs in dampening of near-term growth. Some Directors highlighted the need for the free operation of automatic stabilisers, and the need to retain the possibility of adjustment of the pace of fiscal consolidation. 5 Thus not only the Coalitions party political critics, but also the IMF, have intimated that the coalition government may have talked up and over-egged the sovereign debt risk for the UK, and overstated the imperative nature of fiscal retrenchment on the scale they have set the government upon.
The November 2010 article IV report on the UK included discussion of the debate about fiscal tightening, noting merit on both sides of the argument. The criticisms of a premature fiscal tightening undermining fragile growth included scepticism as to whether the private sector will 'pick up the slack' as the public sector retrenches. Secondly, 'a bleak assessment of the UK's structural deficit could be self-fulfilling: because policymakers assume a large permanent drop in potential output, they tighten policies too early; this causes capital scrapping and human capital losses that a faster recovery would help prevent', and finally, the need to placate bond markets is overstated, given the evolution of long-term UK interest rates (IMF 2010b: 28) .
In 2011, and again in 2012 the IMF downgraded UK growth forecasts (IMF 2011a (IMF , 2012 . Indeed, the size of the state -and the scope of the state -entailed within the austerity and fiscal consolidation programme may in effect 'rule out' such facilitating growth oriented investment to SMEs, or broader infrastructural development. Both the rules-based fiscal architecture brought in under the Coalition, and the 'settings' for appropriate levels for public spending as a proportion of GDP, and the appropriate targets for public spending 'rule out' the kinds of institutional innovations that would be consistent with a British developmental state model. There appears to be 'lock in' to a hope for growth based on the assumed accuracy of 'crowding out' arguments about the private sector 'picking p the slack' as public sector spending and investment retrenches. The Government's fiscal policy, debt and deficit discourse is constructed in such a way that this continues despite the evidence of meagre or no growth, double dip recession, which appears to be at best 'W' shaped, and may even prove to be 'L' shaped.
Conclusions
This paper has analysed the construction of 'debt and deficit' discourse in Britain since the 1990s, and within the IMF since 2008, exploring how far the current crisis has reshaped the arguments about the capacity of governments to manage their national economy (in particular by using fiscal policy) in an open, globalising economy. Much has changed in the realms of economic rectitude and its assessment since 2008. Ironically, in UK/IMF relations in the 1960s the British Government fought the Fund hard to retain flexibility and discretion in the face of IMF moves towards more rules based policy-making. In the current crisis, the IMF is encouraging the UK Government to display more flexibility and nimble response to changing circumstances (notably weaker than hoped-for growth). The UK Government, however, refuses to exploit the fiscal policy space the IMF and others identify at its disposal. One of the more surprising transformations was an increasingly Keynesian Fund trying to encourage a UK Government not to lock itself too tightly into a very draconian fiscal consolidation strategy which will hamper future growth.
In later 2009 and 2010, concerns about government debt burdens and fiscal sustainability began to rise. In the wake of the crisis, only a small number of advanced economies, such as Greece and Portugal, and later Spain and Italy, faced increased borrowing costs linked to particular debt dynamics, national conditions, and track records. Yet with ongoing very low interest rate conditions, and low bond yields for the overwhelming majority of advanced economies, these concerns did not rise in a uniform fashion. This highlights the contingency and context-specificity of financial credibility which is much underplayed in many accounts focusing on neo-liberal policy constraints 'imposed' by financial markets.
The construction of fiscal rectitude by the coalition from May 2010 onwards, and the justification of its fairly dramatic tightening of the fiscal stance, involved evoking the spectre of a British version of the Greek Crisis had these fiscal policy decision not been taken. Their appeal to the authoritative voice of the IMF as endorsing their stance, whilst not entirely disingenuous, does involve a highly selective reading of IMF commentary on the UK economic and fiscal position and policy advice to the UK government. Taking heed of IMF and other calls for differentiated assessments of particular national fiscal positions, which highlight their histories of debt default, revenue raising capacities, as well as their record of creditworthiness within bond markets and the structure and maturity of their debt -all suggest that such a crisis is much less likely to happen in the UK than Greece. Indeed, such a crisis is much less likely than the UK Government have been giving to understand. This all demonstrates the degree to which fiscal rectitude is a contingent social construction, and how national governments can play a key role in its construction, not least be inventing and amending the fiscal rules which constitute the yardsticks by which their rectitude is judged within financial markets.
What this stance locks the British government into is an approach to Britain's poor growth prospects that eschews a role for fiscal activism. How much could fiscal policy plausibly achieve? Well, IMF work on multipliers, and aggregate demand impact of austerity argues that more could be done via the tax system to lighten the burden of adjustment on vulnerable and poorer social groups with a higher marginal propensity to spend. This suggests a potentially greater and more effective role of UK fiscal policy in contributing to growth. Such activism is effectively 'ruled out' if not by reforms to the rules-based fiscal architecture under the Coalition, then by its overall fiscal and economic policy discourse.
The paradox of the Coalition's policies is that by claiming (inaccurately) that any deviation from their policies would lead to a 'Greek-style' collapse they locked themselves into a stance which was very difficult to change when events proved less favourable than hoped in late 2011. We might characterise this problem as the 'big-lie lock-in': once a government has stated that any deviation in its policy stance will be disastrous, it risks serious credibility consequences if policy changes, even if that clearly seems required by economic circumstances. The economic case in favour of more fiscal activism in support of demand, or more public intervention to secure investment in the private sector for growth and employment creating small businesses may be compelling in the context of low or no growth.
But the political costs of such a changed posture, when so much credibility has been invested in the existing stance, would be very high.
